Silver Democracy and Electoral System : Political Feasibility of Policy Reform Plans in an Aging Japan by Okamoto, Akira
－123－
岡山大学経済学会雑誌 51（２・３），2020，123 〜 129
《研究ノート》
Silver Democracy and Electoral System:
Political Feasibility of Policy Reform Plans in an Aging Japan*
 Akira Okamoto
I.  Introduction
　As population aging augments, the costs of providing social security benefits (such as pensions and medical and 
nursing care) will continue to increase significantly. With the decreasing proportion of the working population, who 
are also the supporters of the social security system, securing stable revenue resources is an important issue. Most 
politicians, however, try to avoid discussing such issues that may bring conflicts with the interests of the elderly, 
especially just before an election. Consequently, many serious problems related to family policies, public pension or 
medical insurance systems have not been sufficiently discussed. The reason for this can be easily understood if we 
examine the demographics and composition of voters in Japan.
　As the population ages, the ratio of the elderly (aged 65 and above) to the entire electorate continues to increase 
while that of people in their twenties or thirties continues to decrease. Therefore, given their large voting population, 
the elderly in Japan have significant political power. Their opinions overwhelmingly dominate those of the younger 
demographic—this arrangement has been termed a Silver Democracy. As a result, the implementation of family 
policies (childcare allowances—which is imperative for raising birth rates and desired by many young parents) tends 
to be delayed or postponed. In addition, the reduction of social security benefits, a necessary measure for reducing 
Japan’s vast fiscal deficit, is likely to be difficult to implement as the older demographic is bound to object.
　This paper will investigate the political feasibility of policy reform plans recommended based on the simulation 
results obtained in Okamoto (2020) (see that study for the details of the model settings, adopted assumptions, or the 
simulation analysis). Okamoto (2020) examined the effects of childcare allowances and public pension reforms on 
the demography and the economic welfare in the transition from 2014 to 2300, using an extended lifecycle general 
equilibrium model with endogenous fertility. The simulation results of that study revealed that increases in childcare 
subsidies or decreases in public pension benefits are potentially Pareto-improving from a long-term perspective.
Ⅱ.  Silver Democracy and Electoral System
　According to Okamoto (2020), increasing government childcare subsidies and decreasing public pension 
benefits are recommended policy reform proposals. Since it is vital whether these desirable policies will be, in 
reality, implemented in Japan, this study explores the political feasibility of these policy reform plans. In developed 
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countries, intergenerational conflicts of interest are currently significant. It is often argued that Japan is the world’s 
leading example of a Silver Democracy; in other words, Japan provides generous benefits to older people who enjoy 
significant political power because they are high in number and they vote at a higher rate than the young. With 
the main aim of facilitating family policies and raising the national birth rate, the following three election system 
reform proposals have been developed; the Demeny, remaining life expectancy, and generational voting systems. We 
consider the political feasibility of the above desirable policies not only under the current Japanese voting system (in 
2014) but also under the three novel election systems.
　Next, we explain the three voting system proposals; first, the Demeny voting system was devised by demographer 
Paul Demeny in 1986 (Demeny (1986)). This system provides a political voice for children by allowing parents to 
vote on their behalf. Once children reach the minimum voting age, their parents would no longer vote on their behalf. 
Aoki and Vaithianathan (2009) and Vaithianathan et al. (2013) discussed the introduction of the Demeny voting 
system in Japan. In our analysis, the Demeny voting system means that young people aged 0−19 are given the voting 
right, which was granted at age 20 in 2014 in Japan. It should be noted that the “current” Japanese voting system in 
our study means the system at the point of time in 2014, and that the minimum voting age in Japan was decreased to 
18 in 2016.
　Second, Takeuchi (2012) and Oguro and Ishida (2012) proposed the adoption of a remaining life expectancy voting 
system in Japan. In this system, votes are weighted according to remaining life expectancy, resulting in a higher 
weighting for young over elderly voters. Our analysis incorporated the essence of this novel idea in the following 
way. The remaining life expectancy for each age was applied in our analysis, but Table 1 presents the remaining 
life expectancy only by five ages chopping fine. These values are calculated using data from the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare (2015). The abridged life table data for 2014 provides the remaining life expectancy for males 
and females separately. Our model does not distinguish by gender; therefore, we used male−female average values. 
For example, one vote by a young person aged 20 in 2014 is weighted as 64.03 votes while one vote by an elderly 
person aged 85 is weighted as only 7.30 votes.
　Third, Ihori and Doi (1998) and Doi (2015) advocated a generational election system, which introduces election 
districts divided by region and by generation. In this system, even if the voting rate of the young generation is low, 
a young assemblyman—whose position would likely be representative of the young generation—is always elected 
according to the proportion of this segment of the population. When incorporating the main idea of this scheme into 
our analysis, the generational voting system signifies a 100％ voting rate.
　Furthermore, some researchers such as Senior Professor Toshihiro Ihori (The National Graduate Institute for 
Policy Studies: GRIPS) propose a new voting system in which pensioners are deprived of the right to vote; in other 
words, those aged 65 and above do not have a voting right in this voting system. However, if the elderly give up 
the right of receiving pension benefits, then they are eligible to vote. Although this voting system is substantially 
Table 1.  Remaining life expectancy for each age in Japan
Age 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35
Remaining life expectancy 83.67 78.91 73.93 68.97 64.03 59.14 54.27 49.40
40 50 55 55 60 65 70 75 80 85
44.56 35.07 30.48 30.48 26.02 21.74 17.65 13.77 10.25 7.30
　The table shows remaining life expectancy by five ages chopping fine, although the remaining life expectancy for each age is applied in 
the analysis. Numerical values in the table, which are male-female average values, are calculated using data from the Ministry of Health, 
Labour and Welfare (2015). 
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effective for solving the problem related to a Silver Democracy, our analysis did not deal with this system; because it 
is so dramatic and extremely difficult to implement, and thus seems to be unrealistic.
Ⅲ.  Political Feasibility of Policy Reform Plans
　This paper examines the political feasibility of policy reform proposals recommended in Okamoto (2020). With 
regard to the current Japanese election system (in 2014), the realistic voting rate for each age group is estimated in 
the following way, using data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015b). Table 2 presents 
the voting rate for each age group, which is an average value of the House of Representatives elections and the 
Upper House elections. The average voting rate for each of the two types of election is derived from actual data 
from the last nine elections, respectively. This table suggests that the voting rate for young people in their twenties is 
extremely low and approximately half of that for people in their sixties. Regarding the age group 0−19, we assigned 
a simple average value between the age groups 20−29 and 30−39. This is because parents vote on behalf of babies, 
infants, and juveniles and because the voting rate for high school students is not always low according to recent 
empirical studies. Also, the revised age-population weight shown in Figure 1 is employed as a population weight for 
the count of votes for each age in the analysis.
　First, we assess the political feasibility of the proposed policy of increases in government childcare subsidies. As 
Figure 2 illustrates, the reform proposal Case B (  = 0) with no childcare subsidy makes people aged 45 and below 
Table 2.  Voting rates used in the analysis for each age
Age group 0−19 20−29 30−39 40−49 50−59 60−69 70− Total
Voting rates 46.47％ 38.76％ 54.18％ 63.24％ 69.80％ 76.34％ 65.49％ 59.07％
　The table presents the voting rate for each age group, which is calculated as an average value of the House of Representatives elections 
and the Upper House elections. The average voting rate for each of the two types of election is derived from the data of the last nine 
elections, respectively, using data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2015b). The voting rate for the age group 0−19 
is a simple average value between the age groups 20−29 and 30−39.
Figure 1.   Revised age-population distribution in the 2014 initial steady state
　The figure is based on data from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications (2015a). Because the model in Okamoto (2020) assumes individuals 
live up to 85 years, people aged 86 and above are equally allocated to the age group 
65−85 to replicate a realistic dependency ratio (i.e., aging rate) in the model.
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(in 2014) worse off, while those aged 46 and above better off (see Okamoto (2020) for the details of the simulation 
cases and results, and  is the ratio of government childcare subsidies to the whole childrearing cost). Conversely, 
the reform proposal Case B (  = 0.1) with an increased childcare subsidy makes people aged 45 and below better off 
but those aged 46 and above worse off. The reform proposals Cases B (  = 0.2, 0.3) with a more increased childcare 
subsidy make people aged 44 and below better off but those aged 45 and above worse off. Thus, as the subsidy 
increases, the turning age becomes younger. It should be noted that the turning age is determined by the balance 
between merits and demerits, induced by this policy reform; increases in childcare subsidies transfer resources from 
the older generations to the younger generations, through a higher endogenous tax rate on consumption to finance the 
subsidies.
　Table 3 presents the voting results for Cases B (  = 0.2, 0.3) in which childcare subsidy ratios are increased from 
Table 3.  Voting results for the policy of increases in government childcare subsidies
In Favor Against Results
Cases B (  = 0.2, 0.3) Age 44 and below Age 45 and above
Current voting + Actual voting rate 19.54 44.89 Rejected
Demeny voting + Actual voting rate 29.67 44.89 Rejected
Remaining life expectancy voting + Actual voting rate 975.90 1,033.79 Rejected
Demeny + Remaining life expectancy + Actual voting rate 1,726.56 1,033.79 Approved
Current + Generational voting 38.05 64.74 Rejected
Demeny + Generational voting 59.85 64.74 Rejected
Remaining life expectancy + Generational voting 1,946.67 1,490.09 Approved
Demeny + Remaining life expectancy + Generational voting 3,562.05 1,490.09 Approved
　In Cases B (  = 0.2, 0.3), the ratios of government childcare subsidies are increased from 0.05945 to 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Numerical 
values in the table are the comprehensive number of votes, which take account of the population weight, voting rate, and voting weight of 
each voting system for each individual aged 0−85. The Actual voting rate means a realistic voting rate for each individual. Demeny voting 
signifies that the right to vote is given to young people aged 0−19. Generational voting implies a 100％ voting rate for each individual. The 
age shown in the table is the age in the time of 2014 for each generation.
Figure 2.   Changes in the welfare of each generation for five policy reform cases
　  is the ratio of government childcare subsidies to the whole childrearing cost, 
and θ is the pension replacement ratio.
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0.05945 to 0.2 and 0.3, respectively. Numerical values in the table are the comprehensive number of votes, which 
take account of the population weight, voting rate, and voting weight of each voting system for each individual aged 
0−85. The Actual voting rate in the table means that a realistic voting rate for each individual, presented in Table 2, 
is applied. Demeny voting denotes that the right to vote is given to the young people aged 0−19. Generational voting 
signifies a 100％ voting rate. Table 3 shows that these policy proposals, which potentially attain Pareto improvements 
as shown in Okamoto (2020), are not approved for most cases. These proposals are not approved under the current 
Japanese voting system (in 2014). Even if the Demeny, remaining life expectancy, or generational voting system 
is introduced, the similar result is obtained. A conversion to the most dramatic remaining life expectancy election 
system is the most effective; however, only a combination of the remaining life expectancy voting system and the 
Demeny or generational voting system enables the above recommended policy proposals to be approved. Therefore, 
this result suggests that the actual implementation of family policies such as childcare allowances is difficult unless 
the Japanese voting system is dramatically reformed. The introduction of the remaining life expectancy voting system 
is inevitable as a countermeasure for this serious problem; however, only this system is insufficient and it is required 
to be combined with the Demeny or generational voting system.
　Second, we evaluate the political feasibility of the proposed policy of decreases in public pension benefits. The 
reform proposal Cases C (θ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) with decreased pension benefits make people aged 39 and below (in 
2014) better off, while those aged 40 and above worse off (see Okamoto (2020) for the details of the simulation 
cases and results, and θ is the pension replacement ratio). Conversely, the reform proposal Cases C (θ = 0.5, 0.6) 
with increased pension benefits make people aged 39 and below worse off but those aged 40 and above better off. 
As the replacement ratio increases, the turning age becomes younger; decreases in public pension benefits stimulate 
the household savings, promote the economic growth, and raise the wage rates, resulting in an improvement of the 
individual utility.
　Table 4 presents the voting results for Cases C (θ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) in which the replacement ratios are decreased 
from 0.4 to 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, respectively. The table shows that these policy proposals, which potentially achieve 
Pareto improvements as shown in Okamoto (2020), are not approved for almost all cases. These proposals are 
approved only under a combination of the remaining life expectancy and the Demeny voting systems. Decreases 
Table 4.  Voting results for the policy of decreases in public pension benefits
In Favor Against Results
Cases C (θ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3) Age 39 and below Age 40 and above
Current voting + Actual voting rate 13.47 50.96 Rejected
Demeny voting + Actual voting rate 23.60 50.96 Rejected
Remaining life expectancy voting + Actual voting rate 716.86 1,292.83 Rejected
Demeny + Remaining life expectancy + Actual voting rate 1,467.52 1,292.83 Approved
Current + Generational voting 28.45 74.34 Rejected
Demeny + Generational voting 50.25 74.34 Rejected
Remaining life expectancy + Generational voting 1,537.02 1,899.74 Rejected
Demeny + Remaining life expectancy + Generational voting 3,152.40 1,899.74 Approved
　In Cases C (θ = 0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3), the replacement ratios of public pension benefits are decreased from 0.4 to 0, 0.1, 0.2, and 0.3, 
respectively. Numerical values in the table are the comprehensive number of votes, which take account of the population weight, voting 
rate, and voting weight of each voting system for each individual aged 0−85. The Actual voting rate means a realistic voting rate for each 
individual. Demeny voting signifies that the right to vote is given to young people aged 0−19. Generational voting implies a 100％ voting 
rate for each individual. The age shown in the table is the age in the time of 2014 for each generation.
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in pension benefits enhance the overall economic welfare in the long run, but this reform is extremely difficult to 
execute politically in Japan. The adoption of the remaining life expectancy voting system would be the most effective 
but only in combination with the Demeny voting system is the policy proposal approved. Although the generational 
voting system may be a fairly realistic reform proposal, the magnitude of the effect is not relatively large because 
Japan has a severely distorted population structure, with elderly voters greatly outnumbering younger voters; Japan’s 
aging rate (i.e., dependency ratio) is the highest level in the world at 26.0％ in 2014.
　Therefore, although increases in government childcare subsidies and decreases in public pension benefits are both 
potentially Pareto-improving, our analysis suggests that under the current voting system (in 2014) in Japan, it is 
extremely difficult to actually implement these two recommended policy proposals. Also, although the adoption of 
the remaining life expectancy voting system would be the most effective, this voting system alone is insufficient for 
solving the problem dubbed a Silver Democracy and a combination with another voting system, such as the Demeny 
voting system, is required. Therefore, the result of our analysis reveals that such a dramatic reform is inevitable to 
overcome the problem related to the aging population in Japan. Moreover, as long as the policy reform cases dealt 
with in our analysis, the political feasibility of the reform of decreases in public pension benefits is further lower than 
that of increases in government childcare subsidies. This result may have been mainly caused by the fact that the 
former would directly make the elderly worse off while the latter indirectly through a tax rate hike on consumption.
IV.  Conclusions
　This paper has examined the political feasibility of policy reform plans recommended in Okamoto (2020), namely, 
the promotion of childcare subsidies and the reduction of pension benefits. Concretely, it has evaluated the political 
feasibility of the policy proposals under the current Japanese election system as well as the three voting systems: 
Demeny, remaining life expectancy, and generational. As a result, the analysis has revealed the two main findings:
1.   Both policy reforms (the promotion of childcare subsidies and the reduction of pension benefits) recommended 
from the perspective of economic welfare, are politically extremely difficult to implement under the current 
Japanese voting system; because the elderly outnumber the youth in Japan, and the voting rate of the former is 
also much higher than that of the latter.
2.   The analysis shows that the adoption of the remaining life expectancy voting system, which is a dramatic voting 
reform plan, would be the most effective in solving such a problem. However, the introduction of this novel 
system is insufficient to overcome the extent of population distortion and low voter rates among the young 
generation in Japan. The study suggests that a combination of this system with another voting system, such as the 
Demeny voting system, is necessary. Therefore, it shows that there are complex hurdles for solving this problem 
because Japan has a severely distorted population structure, with few young people and many old people.
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